ABSTRACTStudies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms. However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories, and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were (...) given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals... (shrink)

Une longue introduction précède les contributions de ces trois philosophes et théologiens à la querelle sur la distinction entre l'être et l'essence qui anima la Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Paris dans les années 1280.

"By linking Wittgenstein with Derrida, Staten suggests that the intellectual relevance of deconstruction is wider than the English-speaking public has...

"I had read the book before in the shorter Harper Torchbook edition but read it again right through--and found it as interesting and exciting as before. I regard it as one of the seminal books in the history of ideas. Based on a prodigious amount of original research, it demonstrated conclusively and in fascinating details how the transmission of ancient skepticism was a bital factor in the formation of modern thought. The story is rich in implications for th history of (...) philosophy, the history of science, and the history of religious thought. Popkin's work has already inspired further work by others--and the new edition takes account of this, most importantly the work of Charles Schmitt. The two new chapters extend the story as far as Spinoza, with special reference to the beginnings of biblical criticism.... Popkin's history is of great potential interest to a wide readership--wider than most specialist publications and wider than it has (so far as I can tell) reached hitherto."--M.F. Burnyeat, Professor of Philosophy, University College London. (shrink)

Freedom of association and all institutions coming with it have not been accepted by the Chinese government. Instead, Chinese social organization administration is based upon the concept of association held by the Communist Party of China. The Chinese government had adopted a “total control” model of social organization administration in the era of totalitarianism before the “Opening-up and Reform”, leaving almost no room for social organizations to survive, because the CPC had regarded social organizations as “revolutionary” and “deconstructive”. The Chinese (...) has adopted a graduated control system to administrate social organizations in the era of authoritarianism after the “Opening-up and Reform”, treating social organizations differently according to their threats to the ruling order and their utilities for economic development, because the CPC has viewed social organizations as a “challenging” but “auxiliary” power. The on-going “innovation of registration and administration of social organizations” is not a return to international standard regarding social organization administration in China, but only partial reform of the graduate control system still based upon the CPC’s conception of association as “challenging” but “auxiliary”. Social organizations capable of providing public goods in areas of economic development and social services are given more favorable treatment by the government while political and religious organizations are still tightly controlled by the government. (shrink)

David Mermin suggests that my recent proof pertaining to quan tum nonlocality is undermined by an essential ambiguity pertaining to the meaning of counterfactual statements in quantum physics The ambiguity he cites arise from his imposition of a certain criterion for the meaningfulness of such counterfactual statements That criterion con ates the meaning of a counterfactual statement with the details of a proof of its validity in such a way as to make the meaning of such a statement dependent upon (...) the context in which it occurs That dependence violates the normal demand in logic that the meaning of a statement be de ned by the words in the statement itself not by the context in which the statement occurs My proof conforms to that normal requirement I describe the context independent meaning within my proof of the counterfactual statements in question.. (shrink)

It is often assumed that singular thought requires that an agent be epistemically acquainted with the object the thought is about. However, it can sometimes truthfully be said of someone that they have a belief about an object, despite not being interestingly epistemically acquainted with that object. In defense of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought, it is thus often claimed that belief ascriptions are context sensitive and do not always track the contents of an agent’s mental states. This (...) paper uses first-person attitude reports to argue that contextualism about belief ascriptions does not present an adequate defense of an acquaintance constraint on singular thought. (shrink)

La acción a distancia se ha considerado muy a menudo como un medio de explicación inaceptable en la física. Debido a que daba la impresión de resistirse a los intentos de asignarle causas propias a los efectos, la acción a distancia se ha proscrito como sinsentido ocultista. El rechazo de la acción a distancia fue el principal precepto del aristotelismo que fue tan dominante en la filosofía natural europea, y hasta hoy permanece como un prejuicio principal de la física moderna. (...) No obstante, hubo un período de interregno; un período durante el cual las acciones a distancia eran fácilmente aceptadas por un número ignificativo de filósofos naturales. La principal influencia sobre este nuevo enfoque radical hacia la naturaleza de la causalidad física fue, por supuesto, Isaac Newton. El principio de gravitación universal de Newton a muchos les pareció dar no sólo un ejemplo innegable de una fuerza cuya naturaleza no se podía producir por ningún tipo de contacto mecánico entre los cuerpos, sino también un modelo para otras supuestas fuerzas que podían suponerse que dan cuenta de los fenómenos químicos, biológicos y otros fenómenos físicos. Por tanto, durante el siglo XVIII, como lo han demostrado un gran número de importantes estudios históricos, los filósofos naturales buscaron hacer fructífero el deseo de Newton, expresado en el Prefacio a los Principia, de que todos los fenómenos de la naturaleza fueran explicados en términos de fuerzas atractivas y repulsivas que operan a distancia entre las partículas diminutas de los cuerpos. Sin embargo, en la actualidad el rechazo a la legitimidad de las acciones a distancia es tan grande que una serie de notables especialistas de Newton han insistido en que Newton nunca creyó en la actio in distans y que fue completamente malentendido por la generación que le sucedió. Este artículo reitera que Newton sí creía en la acción a distancia y refuta los argumentos de especialistas recientes que sostienen lo contrario. (shrink)

SLONIMSKY: HERAKLIT UND PARMENIDES PHAR 7.1.

SummaryThis paper attempts to develop an interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism which is based upon his critique of transcendental realism . It is argued that given Kant's transcendental distinction, all non‐ or pre‐critical philosophies, even Berkeleian phenomenalism are transcendentally realistic. This paradoxical result is used as the basis for an analysis of Kant's resolution of the mathematical antinomies, wherein this resolution is seen both as an “indirect proof” of transcendental idealism and as a refutation of transcendental realism. Finally, it is (...) claimed that Kant's idealism, at least insofar as it is established by means of a refutation of transcendental realism, is methodological rather than metaphysical, viz. it involves a claim about how the sensible world is to be considered in transcendental reflection, not a claim about the “real nature” of this world.RésuméCet article essaye de développer une interprétation de l'idéalisme transcendental de Kant, interprétation basée sur sa critique du réalisme transcendental . L'auteur montre que, si l'on accepte la distinction transcendentale de Kant, toutes les philosophies non critiques et précritiques sont transcendentalement réalistes, y compris le phénoménalisme de Berkeley. A partir de ce résultat paradoxal, il analyse la manière dont Kant résoud les antinomies mathématiques: cette résolution apparaît à la fois comme preuve indirecte de l'idéalisme transcendental et comme une réfutation du réalisme transcendental. L'auteur est finalement d'avis que l'idéalisme de Kant, du moins lorsqu'il est justifié par une réfutation du réalisme transcendental, est plus méthodologique que métaphysique, c'est‐à‐dire qu'il déclare comment le monde sensible doit être considéré dans la réflexion transcendentale et non quelle est la véritable nature de ce monde.ZusammenfassungEs wird versucht, eine Interpretation von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus zu entwickeln, die auf seiner Kritik am transzendentalen Realismus — verstanden als derjenige Standpunkt, der systematisch Erscheinung und Ding an sich verwechselt — beruht. Es wird argumentiert, dass — einmal Kants transzendentale Unterscheidung angenommen — aile früheren, vorkritischen Systeme der Philosophie einschliesslich Berkeleys Phänomenalismus transzendental realistisch sind. Dieses paradoxale Ergebnis wird als Basis für eine Analyse von Kants Auflösung der mathematischen Antinomien verwendet, wobei dièse Auflösung sowohl als ein indirekter Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus als auch als eine Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realismus gedeutet wird. Es wird schliesslich nahegelegt, dass Kants Idealismus, sofern wenigstens als er sich auf Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realismus abstützt, mehr ein rnethodologischer als ein metaphysischer Idealismus ist. Er statuiert eher über die Art, wie die Sinneswelt in einer transzendentalen Reflexion betrachtet werden soll, als über die Frage, wie die Welt wirklich beschaffen sei. (shrink)

Naguère suspecte, voire rejetée, l'histoire du temps présent a pris aujourd'hui une place sans commune mesure dans l'espace public comme à l'Université - avec l'explosion du nombre d'étudiants en cette matière. A cela, plusieurs raisons : la mémoire et le patrimoine ont envahi l'espace public et scientifique ; le témoignage a pris l'allure d'un impératif social et moral ; la justice temporelle s'est muée en tribunal de l'histoire pour juger de crimes politiques vieux de plusieurs décennies mais dont l'après-coup continue (...) de cheminer dans notre présent. Une évidence, dira-t-on. Mais mesure-t-on pour autant le revirement qui se joue ici? Car le passé n'est plus cet ensemble de traditions à respecter, d'héritages à transmettre, de connaissances à élaborer ni de morts à commémorer ; c'est un constant «travail» de deuil ou de mémoire à entreprendre, tant s'est enracinée l'idée que si le passé doit être arraché des limbes de l'oubli, seuls des dispositifs publics ou privés peuvent l'en exhumer, avec ou sans l'aide de l'historien. Tel est le «présentisme» : devenu un problème à résoudre, et désormais un champ de l'action publique, le passé - et singulièrement le passé proche, celui des dernières catastrophes en date - n'est pas oublié, il est constamment mobilisé et reformulé selon les urgences du jour. L'exigence de vérité propre à la démarche historique s'est muée en exigence sociale de reconnaissance, en politiques de réparation, en discours d'excuses à l'égard des victimes. La question de la contemporanéité n'est pas nouvelle : elle s'est posée à travers les âges, mais Henry Rousso prend la mesure de sa profonde transformation au cours des deux grands après-guerres du XXe siècle et définit ses enjeux fondamentaux : comment écrire une histoire en train de se faire? Comment mettre à distance la proximité apparente? Comment se battre sur deux fronts à la fois - celui de l'histoire et celui de la mémoire, celui d'un présent que l'on ne veut pas voir passer et celui d'un passé qui revient hanter le présent? La nouvelle histoire du contemporain, toute entière inscrite dans cette tension, est plus que jamais marquée par l'incertitude, l'instabilité et l'inachèvement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte by Manfred GawlinaHenry E. AllisonManfred Gawlina. Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 128. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996. Pp. ix + 345.This work is the first full scale study of the controversy between Kant and the Wolffian philosopher Johann August Eberhard. The controversy was launched by Eberhard’s publication in 1788 of the first part of the first volume of the Philosophisches (...) Magazin, a journal which he and a handful of associates created specifically as an organ for attacking the Kantian philosophy from the standpoint of Leibniz and Wolff. The central claim was that whatever is true in the Kantian philosophy is already contained in Leibniz, and where Kant differs from Leibniz (such as in the denial of knowledge of things in themselves or “true things”) he goes astray. Kant reacted strongly to this [End Page 632] critique, first in a pair of letters to Reinhold (May 12 and 19, 1789) and then in his own published response, with the sarcastic title: Über eine Entdeckung. nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll1 From Eberhard’s side the controversy continued through three more volumes of the Philosophisches Magazin (1790–92), and two volumes of its successor, Philosophisches Archiv (1792–95). Although Kant himself did not respond directly to these subsequent attacks, he contributed material to Johann Schulz for his review of the second volume of the Philosophisches Magazin.Gawlina analyzes the controversy at both the pragmatic and philosophical levels. The former includes a consideration of the motivations of the protagonists and the various strategies and tactics adopted in an attempt to convince the philosophical public of the correctness of their respective positions. Eberhard, for his part, was particularly concerned with the threat which the Critique, which Kant himself describes as the “Medusa head” (hence the title), posed to the survival of Leibnizian-style metaphysics, while Kant’s primary concern was with the misrepresentation of his own philosophy that he saw in Eberhard’s attack. At the philosophical level, the controversy is presented as a clash between two conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable philosophical paradigms: the first being the ontological orientation of Leibniz (defended by Eberhard) according to which pure (contradiction-free) thought mirrors being (this entails that logic has ontological significance), and the epistemological-transcendental orientation of Kant, according to which the fundamental questions concern the conditions of human knowledge and the justification of its claims. The author is well aware that there are epistemological elements in Leibniz and ontological ones in Kant (most notably the claims about space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic), but he argues persuasively that these are grounded in the philosopher’s respective ontological and epistemological standpoints.This general thesis serves to illuminate virtually all of the main points of the controversy, including the question of why Eberhard refuses to admit either the significance or novelty of the analytic-synthetic distinction, while Kant insists on both. Of particular interest in this regard is the author’s discussion of the distinction between Schranken (limits) and Grenzen (boundaries), which Kant himself draws in the Prolegomena (§58). This distinction becomes relevant to the controversy because of Eberhard’s frequent appeal to the fact that Leibniz recognizes the Schranken of human knowledge as part of his attempt to show that Leibniz anticipated Kant in providing a “critique of pure reason.” As Gawlina notes, however, the limits of knowledge, as understood by Leibniz, are merely de facto constraints on the extent to which finite minds are capable of grasping things from the eternalistic perspective of God, whereas the boundaries insisted on by Kant are principled restrictions, grounded in the positive conditions of the possibility of cognition for finite knowers. [End Page 633]Although Gawlina thus clearly indicates the ways in which Eberhard misunderstood and misrepresented Kant’s position, he refuses to declare Kant the victor in the controversy. This is partly on historical and partly on philosophical grounds. Historically, the reason is that in spite of all of its limitations, Eberhard’s critique of Kant did succeed in raising questions among Kant’s followers regarding the coherence of the... (shrink)

Some seeming logical deficiencies in a recent paper are described. The author responds to the arguments of the work by de Muynck, De Baere, and Martens , who argue it is widely accepted today that some sort of nonlocal effect is needed to resolve the problems raised by the works of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen and John Bell. In MBM a variety of arguments are set forth that aim to invalidate the existing purported proofs of nonlocality and to provide, moreover, (...) a local solution to the problems uncovered by EPR and Bell. Much of the argumentation in MBM is based on the idea of introducing `nonideal` measurements, which, according to MBM, allow one to construct joint probability distributions for incompatible observables. The existence of a bona fide joint probability distribution for the incompatible observables occurring in the EPRB experiments would entail that Bell`s inequalities can be satisfied, and hence that the mathematical basis for the nonlocal effects would disappear. This relult would apparently allow one to eliminate the need for nonlocal effects by considering experiments of this new kind. (shrink)

Evocation de la découverte de l'Orient par Teilhard de Chardin et analyse de la vision teilhardienne de ce que devrait apporter l'Orient à l'Occident. L'originalité de sa démarche se caractèrise par l'intégration du phénomène religieux au coeur du phénomène humain et plus précisément par l'idée d'une "convergence des religions".

Este texto resume algunas críticas sobre el uso de la modelación matemática y estadística en temas relacionados con el conflicto armado. Para lo cual se presenta la teoría pura de la guerra a partir de Carl Von Clausewitz; la cual se muestra como condición necesaria para los modelos formales. Luego de ello se demarcan los alcances de estos modelos y sus limitaciones.

This paper analyzes Kant's thesis in the Tugendlehre that there are certain ends that we are obligated to adopt. It contends that none of the three arguments which Kant advances in support of this thesis succeeds and that the attempted reconstruction by Nelson Potter likewise fails. It then maintains that the argument does work, if one brings in, as an implicit premise, transcendental freedom. Finally, it is argued that this late doctrine of obligatory ends marks a significant advance over the (...) treatment of broad duties in the Grundlegung and can serve as a basis for defending Kant's ethics against the familiar emptiness charge. Der Beitrag untersucht die These Kants in der Tugendlehre , daß es bestimmte Zwecke gibt, zu deren Verfolgung wir verpflichtet sind. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß keines der drei Argumente, die Kant zur Stützung dieser These verwendet, durchgreift und daß der diesbezügliche Rekonstruktionsversuch von Nelson Potter ebenso fehlschlägt. Es wird weiterhin die Ansicht vertreten, daß die Argumentation dann überzeugt, wenn man die transzendentale Freiheit als Prämisse einbezieht. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß diese späte Lehre Kants von den Zwecken, die zugleich Pflicht sind, einen erheblichen Fortschritt gegenüber der Behandlung der weiten Pflichten in der Grundlegung bedeutet und eine Grundlage dafür bietet, Kants Ethik gegen den üblichen Vorwurf des leeren Formalismus in Schutz zu nehmen. (shrink)

Perhaps the ultimate significance of Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy lies in its attempted reconciliation of the transcendental, logical orientation of continental rationalism with the humanistic, psychological approach of British empiricism. With the rationalists, Kant distinguished sharply between questions concerning the causes and origins of our knowledge and questions about its limits and objective validity. Thus, a rigorous critique of psychologism, i.e. of any attempt to explain, or explain away the validity of either our cognitive or moral principles by means (...) of an analysis of their basis in human nature or their genesis in human experience, is one of the most characteristic traits of the Kantian philosophy. Yet this transcendental, logical investigation of the nature and limits of knowledge, and of the fundamental principles of morality leads Kant back to the human subject, in whose cognitive faculties he finds the a priori principles of human knowledge and in whose autonomy he finds the basis of the categorical imperative. This gives rise to a paradoxical conception of man as on the one hand, together with the rest of creation, a part of nature, subject to its laws, and on the other hand, in his capacity as knower and actor, a rational being who not only transcends nature in the sense that he is not completely determined by its laws, but who is actually the author of these laws. (shrink)